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Abstract  
This article explores managerial perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of 
individual performance related pay schemes. It draws upon findings from a two part 
study of middle managers' interpretation and application of performance related pay 
processes in a variety of organisational contexts. The analysis reveals that middle 
managers all too often do not share the principles or the stated objectives of the 
schemes they are required to operationalise. It concludes that the importance of 
managerial values and beliefs about rewarding individual contribution has been an 
overlooked and underestimated dimension in the design and application of individual 
performance related pay schemes (IPRP) despite the significance of the manager 's 
role in their organisational effectiveness. 
 
Introduction  
 
The architects of strategic performance interventions are reliant on line management 
to transmit the desired corporate messages but line managers have also been identified 
as the weak link in the application of performance management systems (Hendry et 
al., 1997). This paper will argue that their belief in the operational appropriateness 
and fairness of such systems is a critical success factor. Through a survey of middle 
managers working in different employment sectors it explores: 
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a) managerial perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of current 
organisational approaches to rewarding performance in terms of  encouraging 
the types of behaviours employers stated that they were seeking from their 
employees. 
b) the ways in which line managers interpret and apply these processes to achieve 
their own organisational priorities.  
 
Based on the study's findings, it is will be argued that the importance of managerial 
values and assumptions about rewarding individual performance has been an 
overlooked and underestimated dimension in the design and application of individual 
performance related pay processes (IPRP). The extent to which line managers charged 
with implementing pay policies share the values that led to their development is both 
debatable and largely unknown. In practice, the  study revealed that this was largely 
assumed rather than actively pursued and developed. 
 
The study  
The study was in two phases. The first phase (discussed in Harris, 1999) took place in 
1995 and involved a survey of sixty managers. They were predominantly in middle 
management roles and were employed in a wide variety of sectors. Thirty-eight 
worked in the private sector (including pharmaceuticals, engineering, textiles, retail 
and distribution, transport and communications, banking and insurance), and twenty-
two in the actual or recent public sector (the Health Service, the Civil Service and the 
privatised utilities).  
 
 3 
 In 80% of the organisations respondents were responsible for making decisions about 
pay for the employees in their own sections or departments. In addition, all 
respondents were recipients of individual performance pay although for one third of 
them the scheme they experienced was in some way different from the one they were 
required to implement for more junior staff. The aim of the survey was to identify, 
through an initial questionnaire and follow up semi-structured interviews, the line 
manager's perspective on the effectiveness of performance related pay processes in 
terms of encouraging the types of behaviours employers stated they were seeking 
from their employees. 
 
The respondents indicated wide support for the principle of rewarding employee 
contributions; equally, however their experiences with their own organisational 
processes led them to be both cautious and concerned at what the new approaches 
actually delivered. The managers identified a set of non publicised objectives which 
were, in their view, more important than the officially stated objectives for the 
introduction of IPRP. The 'official agenda' was to increase employee commitment and 
improve individual motivation through a fairer reward system more focused on 
business objectives; the 'hidden agenda' was far more concerned with the control 
aspects of performance management system, with changing the culture, making 
managers manage, dealing with issues of under performance, reducing staffing levels 
and costs whilst increasing workloads. Such objectives were identified by 78% of 
respondents as the real driving forces behind the introduction of IPRP. Figure 1 
summarises the perceptions of the respondents in the initial survey. 
 
Insert figure one 
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 For the respondents, IPRP tended to result in practice, at least for a significant 
minority of employees, in strong feelings of unfairness, an erosion of commitment 
and a growth of uncertainty and anxiety. Respondents described how they tried to 
reduce what they regarded as the most negative aspects of IPRP in the way they 
interpreted and applied the process. Their main aims emerged as trying to maximise 
stability for the employees they were responsible for and minimising any erosion of 
employee perceptions of their own personal trustworthiness. 
 
The results from this first phase of the study reported above gave rise to a series of 
further questions :- 
 Why did line managers view the schemes so negatively whilst continuing to 
support the principle of a pay system which recognised individual contribution? 
 
 Why, in spite of the emphasis of the reported emphasis on devolving HR 
responsibilities to the line, did respondents feel so little personal ownership of, 
and commitment to, the performance processes they were required to implement?  
 
 What were the managers' own views of fairness and justice when rewarding 
employee contribution and how did they apply these in practice in reaching 
individual decisions? 
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Figure 1: Middle Managers perceptions of organisational initiatives on 
individual performance related pay 
 
 
Hidden Agenda 
 
• Change the culture 
• Remove complacency  
• Make managers manage 
• Save salary costs 
• Reduce staffing  
     levels 
• Increase work   
     loads 
• More control  
• Focus on under   
     performance 
• Greater      
     compliance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stated Objectives 
 
• Increase employee 
     commitment  
• Improve individual 
motivation 
• Better communications 
• Greater feedback 
• More employee    
     flexibility 
• Focus on business  
      objectives 
• More responsibility to line 
managers 
• Fairer reward system 
• Identify and reward good 
performance 
 
 
Perceived  Outcomes 
 
• Increased stress and 
anxiety 
• Focus on control  
• Growth of uncertainty 
• Protection of  individual  
     territory 
• Reduced employee  
     flexibility 
• Erosion of  commitment 
for  a  significant minority 
• Distrust of  
     Management 
• Feelings of unfairness 
• Loss of goodwill 
• Motivates high  
     performer in the short   
     term 
 6 
 
 
 
Phase 2 
The second phase of the research took place in 1998 - 1999. All the previous 
respondents were re-contacted and 36 of them took part in a series of follow up, in-
depth interviews. Of the earlier sample, twelve managers had moved to another 
employer or to new roles while six others worked in companies that were undergoing 
major restructuring or mergers which made the study's timing inopportune. Three 
organisations had actually discontinued the individual performance element of their 
pay systems and were in the process of a total redesign of their performance and 
reward structures. The remaining managers for a variety of work related issues felt 
unable to participate in a further study but indicated that their earlier perceptions of 
the performance pay processes they implemented remained essentially the same. 
 
One third of the new sample reported that their organisations were either in the 
process of reviewing their performance and related pay structures or had already made 
changes since the earlier study. This trend is in line with the findings of the IPD’s last 
survey of Performance Pay in the UK which found four out of ten organisations had 
modified their PRP schemes between 1995 - 1998 ( IPD, 1998).  
 
The IPD's results suggested that organisations were increasingly 'adapting their 
schemes to improve the fit between reward and organisational strategies'. (1998:6). 
Similarly the author's respondents identified that their schemes had been or were 
being adapted with the aim of obtaining a better integration with other HR policies 
and company objectives. For example, six schemes now provided for more frequent 
formal performance reviews; a greater emphasis was being placed on identifying 
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development needs and separating these from the evaluation of performance for pay 
purposes; and the devolution of HR responsibilities to the line had continued, with 
line managers increasingly being held responsible for coaching and developing their 
staff as part of their personal targets.  
 
Despite all this change, only six respondents reported being part of the review 
process. There had been company-wide attitude surveys aimed at ascertaining the 
major influences on 'employee commitment and satisfaction'. But as Winstanley and 
Stuart-Smith (1996) suggest the design of strategic approaches to performance 
management relies more heavily on 'stakeholder analysis' than 'stakeholder synthesis'. 
Put another way, stakeholders' views may be elicited to see how they impact upon the 
overall business strategy rather than for actual incorporation into the design of the 
process. The lack of involvement of the line managers in the design process was 
mirrored by their continuing lack of ownership of the schemes they found themselves 
implementing and by their sense that these had been imposed rather than agreed. 
 
The framework for structuring the follow up interviews was developed from the three 
factors which had been identified in the first phase of the study as most heavily 
influencing respondent perceptions of performance related pay. These were the 
organisational context, personal views on fairness and equity and managerial 
behaviours. These were used as the framework for structuring the 'follow up' 
interviews with the individual managers.  
 
A difficulty in the first phase lay in distinguishing between respondent perceptions of 
having their own performance evaluated and those associated with acting as 
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evaluators when carrying out line management responsibilities. To reduce this 
potential confusion the questions in the second phase interviews focused on line 
manager responsibilities in the operation of IPRP although it is recognised their own 
experiences when being personally appraised could still colour individual responses.  
 
Respondents were asked to consider the three most significant positive and negative 
outcomes of the performance pay processes they were required to implement. Their 
responses are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 . Interestingly whilst respondents had 
little difficulty in identifying the negative outcomes, positive outcomes proved to be 
far more difficult to identify and six were unable to suggest any. 
 
Insert Table One and Table Two 
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Table 1  Positive Outcomes for the Managerial role  
 
What would you identify as the positive outcomes of IPRP to you as a manager in undertaking your 
HR responsibilities?  
 
Positive Outcomes                % who identified among the first three 
Helps with the planning and organising of work 61%   
Able to recognise those individuals who have contributed the most 70% 
Makes me formally appraise all my staff 55% 
It has changed the culture , people are generally less complacent 14% 
Agreeing targets does help to focus staff                                                                  33%   
It makes it easier to monitor performance  48% 
 
Table 2 Negative Outcomes for the Managerial Role  
What would you identify as the negative outcomes of  IPRP for you as a manager in undertaking your 
HR responsibilities  
        
Negative outcomes        % who identified among the first three 
It does not act as a motivator for the majority 68% 
Just not worth all the time and trouble for the amounts involved                             67% 
It is a very time consuming process                                                                          72% 
There are too many constraints imposed on the decision making process                64% 
Presents me with conflicting objectives                                                                    12% 
Leads to injustices when you can't reward individuals who deserve recognition     19% 
Individuals become too focused on their personal targets  25% 
Unworkable at times of major organisational upheaval  17%  
Can be a real demotivator when employees feel they have been unfairly treated     26% 
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Organisational Constraints   
Organisational constraints were identified as a major cause of subsequent unfairness 
which eroded the effectiveness of the rewards system as a motivator (Storey and 
Sisson, 1993). 85% of the managers identified such constraints as the overwhelming 
influence on the outcomes of the process and their ability to make 'effective and fair' 
pay decisions. Many were beyond the direct control of the organisation but they were 
nevertheless seen as a key influences on IPRP's effectiveness. During a period when 
low  inflation had led to total annual pay awards averaging around three percent, a 
repeated observation was that there was insufficient money for IPRP to be an 
effective motivator.  
 
The size of the compensation pot was highlighted as a critical factor in the process 
and, in some instances, its impact could be altogether eradicated if overly small as 
Marsden and Richardson (1992) reported in their study of Inland Revenue staff. 
Similarly the IPD's  survey (1998) found three quarters of employers feeling that their 
IPRP awards were, to some degree too low to act as a motivator. Smaller awards 
encouraged the managers to take an increasingly collective approach to pay decisions 
on the basis that 'for such a small amount it is not worth the hassle involved’. This 
was particularly the experience among the public sector participants where the 
managers' views were typified by the Departmental Head in the Civil Service who 
observed ‘ if there isn’t much for anyone then it is better to share it as evenly as 
possible – it makes for less trouble in the long run.’ 
 
Asked to consider the benefits of the IPRP process, 61% of the managers identified 
the related processes of identifying goals, planning and organising work. The relative 
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value placed on any monetary benefit and the clarification of expectations was found 
to be heavily influenced by the occupational group's expectations. For example, 
Dowling and Richardson’s (1997:360) survey of performance-related pay for 
managers in the National Health Service revealed that the money available was less 
important as a motivator than the clarification of their objectives that the scheme had 
introduced. It was concluded that the degree of success of the NHS scheme revolved 
mostly around the way in which work objectives were set. 
 
Despite these positive outcomes, the major issue (identified by 72% of respondents) 
was that performance measurement and evaluation were taking up growing amounts 
of managerial time. This was increasing with organisational requirements for more 
continuous formal monitoring to encourage earlier managerial attention to potential 
problems than offered by a traditional annual appraisal process. For 'hard pressed' 
managers faced with a continuing escalation in the range of their HR responsibilities, 
the outcomes of the process needed to demonstrably justify the time and effort spent 
on it. Only three respondents were fully confident that this was the case. Gratton et 
al’s longitudinal study (1999) of eight 'high profile' companies similarly found the 
bureaucracy of performance management processes and the constant documentation 
attracting regular criticism.  
 
Whilst respondents could see value in a proper recording system, if only to be able to 
subsequently defend their own decision making, there was a feeling that overly 
bureaucratic processes and ensuring that 'the paper trail was fully in place' had 
become objectives in their own right at the cost of investing in the quality of personal 
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interactions and gaining commitment through high trust relationships between 
manager and employee.  
 
The practice of centrally imposing organisational parameters on the allocation and 
distribution of ratings (Snell, 1992) was a considerable source of frustration for 
managers who saw it as negating the intentions of the pay policy. Having been 
exhorted to manage and to discriminate between different levels of performance it 
was widely regarded as 'interference' then to impose a predetermined formula for pay 
decisions. Instructions from the central HR function to follow a particular distribution 
pattern led one manager in the banking sector to observe ' I don't know why they asked 
the line managers to get involved in the first place if they intended to tell us all along 
how to make the decisions.' 
 
Recognising that a centrally imposed pay matrix was causing managers to lose faith in 
the system, a number of UK companies - for example, United Distillers and Scottish 
Amicable - have led the way by abandoning a pay matrix (IDS, 1997). Local 
managers in these companies are now allocated a budget and expected to distribute it 
as pay awards based on their ratings of an employee performance. Such an option is 
less feasible in organisations where labour costs are a major part of overall costs or 
the pay budget is largely externally imposed as in the public sector. 
 
Although there had been a general trend since the first survey for setting goals which 
encouraged team working and co-operation, a quarter of respondents felt that their 
PRP systems still encouraged too great a focus on personal targets, which resulted in  
inflexibility. This was also as reducing innovation when individuals perceived they 
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were more likely to be rewarded for conformity than risk taking, especially where 
results could be less easily measurable and more unpredictable. The managers 
themselves recognised that adhering to a 'tried and tested' route to achieve their 
personal goals was a more predictable route to achieving targets and organisational 
recognition. For Whitener et al (1998:525) this leads to a 'potentially tragic outcome' 
for organisations seeking to encourage a more trusting organisational climate and 
greater flexibility which will never be realised because of the reluctance of managers 
and employees to take the risks involved.  
 
Finally one issue which had not been identified as a key consideration in the initial 
survey was the appropriateness of performance related pay systems at a time of major 
organisational upheaval. This had been a personal experience for a number of 
respondents and 17% observed that they felt IPRP was unworkable in periods of 
significant internal restructuring and should be discontinued. 
 
Fairness and Equity 
The 'in depth' interview data revealed that many of the organisations in the study 
sample had made significant endeavours in the design of their systems to demonstrate 
the procedural justice of their schemes. This was particularly evident in providing 
opportunities for 'employee voice' in the process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) through 
publicised appeal procedures and a commitment to transparency.  
 
Despite these arrangements respondents believed that there were real political 
constraints when it came to their application in practice. The irony is that whilst the 
managers pointed to the anger and frustration that lapses in procedural fairness could 
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cause, they could themselves be the perpetuators of such injustices. Inconsistencies in 
performance assessments and related pay decisions across and between different 
levels of managers were recognised as a significant problem and a justifiable source 
of grievance for certain employees. The respondents quoted personal experiences of 
unfairness in the evaluation of their own performances and the role models set by 
senior managers emerged as an crucial factor in setting the standards of behaviour for 
the managers to follow in dealing with their own staff.  
 
Nearly two thirds of the respondents identified their ability to reward individual 
employees for their contribution as a benefit of their system. In practice, however,  
they frequently revealed a value system that made it difficult for them to exercise their 
judgement in the way a scheme intended. Faced with offering financial recognition to 
only a selected few best performers managers had to make uncomfortable choices 
between alienating those high performers they were unable to sufficiently reward or 
treating everyone the same by singling no one out for a higher award. This operational 
dilemma was exacerbated in circumstances where there was insufficient financial 
reward available to meet employees' expectations.  
 
Mindful of future co-operation and trying to keep their own trustworthiness in tact, 
the majority of managers elected for a collective approach. This led to criticisms from 
senior management that they were failing to operate the scheme properly. The 
Compensation Manager for a recently mutualised Building Society grappling with this 
very problem among local branch managers complained 'the trouble with our branch 
managers is that they are too close to the staff they supervise, they are still in the 
trenches fighting with the troops'.  
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 Where team work and close co-operation were fundamental to the effective working 
of a section or department, the managers resorted to their own coping strategies which 
reflected their own concepts of equity and distributive justice (Miller, 1996) rather 
than the principles upon which the systems were based. Resorting to a collective 
approach highlights one of the fundamental tensions for managers in the application 
of  IPRP. In terms of a survival mechanism for managers trying to achieve high levels 
of trust and reciprocity it is a justifiable means of achieving what Watson (1994: 32) 
describes as ‘productive co-operation.’ If, however, the expectation of employees is 
that the objective is to distinguish between different levels of performance, such an 
approach can increase the sense of unfairness employees have about a process which 
in practice offers neither procedural nor distributive justice.  
 
Managerial behaviours 
Building up and reinforcing managerial trustworthiness was identified by respondents 
as the essential ingredient in ensuring future employee co-operation and commitment. 
Blau (1964) observes that trust is generated by reciprocating for the benefits received 
from another and through a build up of exchanges over time. Yet managers and 
employees are also involved in a series of economic exchanges in their relationships 
which place little emphasis on trust but are concerned with attempts to structure the 
employment relationship to protect personal interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). The tensions 
between these different exchange relationships were evident in the managers' reported 
difficulties in reaching IPRP decisions. In trying to satisfy the requirements of one 
form of exchange, they found themselves struggling to meet the requirements of the 
other.  
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 This dilemma was well illustrated by the differing approaches adopted by two line 
managers. The control based approach of one Manager in the Electricity Supply 
Industry was summarised as ' well they may not like me but at least I am a consistent 
bastard and they know I will try make sure rewards go to those who contribute the 
most'’ contrasted strongly with the Health Service Manager who saw attempts to 
incentivise individual pay 'as demotivating for the majority'. She described her role as 
maintaining trust and co-operation through 'not rocking the boat by singling 
individuals out for different treatment but keeping my lot as happy as possible to cope 
with the mounting pressure of work'.  
 
Butler et al (1991) observed that politics can thwart changes in performance 
management processes and certainly two thirds of managers in the study saw their 
role, at times, as one of lessening the harsher aspects of senior management policy. 
Achieving and sustaining predictability in the employment relationship is, as 
Osterman (1987) suggests, a less recognised but central objective of management. 
This was evident among the respondents who tried to mitigate the negative aspects of 
IPRP if it was seen to be adversely affecting employee commitment or leading to 
employee 'survival anxiety' (Boxall 1996). Their rationale for doing so was largely 
explained by the importance they attached to maintaining trust in their relationships 
with the employees they supervised. Although this was driven partly by self interest to 
achieve prescribed targets it was also out of a belief that this was a better way to 
maintain employee commitment than through an reward processes which 68% had 
identified as ‘not motivating the majority’.  
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Obtaining future reciprocity and employee co-operation were, from the middle 
managers' perspective, key considerations in demonstrating trustworthiness and 
fairness in pay decisions. The dimensions of trustworthy behaviours identified by 
respondents were behavioural consistency, personal integrity and honesty, sharing and 
delegating control, regular communication and the demonstration of concern for the 
individual. Based on the behaviours they had personally experienced 'good managers‘ 
were described as those who shared informed, explained decisions and talked through 
issues. In those organisations where secrecy was a defining characteristic of the pay 
process, as it was in one large pharmaceutical company, respondents saw this as 
leading to low trust which they tried to mitigate by sharing whatever information they 
had at their disposal.  
 
Where organisational constraints had eroded the potential to deliver what managers 
regarded as their part of the deal it encouraged them to blame the limitations of the 
process in justifying pay decisions to employees. The danger observed in an earlier 
study on the introduction of performance management systems was that this could 
lead to a form of 'abdication management' (Beaver and Harris, 1996) where managers 
blamed any inconsistencies in their decision making on the vagaries of the system 
rather than their own judgements. Whilst many line managers welcomed the 
opportunity to make pay decisions about their own staff, a fifth of respondents found 
being in the spotlight just too uncomfortable and felt ill prepared which resulted in the 
familiar excessive ‘middling’ in performance ratings. 
 
Conclusions  
The study revealed a group of line managers who were widely supportive of the view 
that pay systems which recognised individual performance were fairer, in principle, 
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than systems of pay based on rewarding seniority (Lawler 1973: Kessler and Purcell, 
1992). Similarly Guest and Conway (1997) found evidence in the third annual survey 
of the state of the employment relationship in the UK that employees had a preference 
for working in organisations where there was 'an attempt to link pay and 
performance'. Yet the managers reported an ongoing gap between the 'espoused' 
theory of paying for performance and what was delivered in practice (Stiles, 1999). A 
lack of congruence in the objectives of organisational performance management 
processes was illustrated by the lack of real incentives in the present systems to 
encourage line managers to invest time in supporting, encouraging and developing 
employees. Despite recent modifications to many schemes recognition was still 
identified as more attainable through the achievement of short term, measurable 
targets.  
 
Although it had been anticipated that the beliefs and values of the managers would be 
highly influenced by the employment sector they worked in this factor was not as 
significant as expected. Although the general level of concerns about IPRP schemes 
where they existed were greater in the public than private sector much of this was due 
to organisational constraints rendering the process unworkable in the eyes of the 
managers rather than any deep rooted belief in its unacceptability. 
 
The evidence from the author’s study and the IPD's survey of performance related pay 
(1998) in the UK reveal what appears to be significant differences between those 
issues regarded by employers as serious problems and the degree of importance 
attached to them by middle managers. Whereas the IPD's research reported that the  
amount of managerial time a scheme took up was regarded as a serious problem by 
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only 13 % of employers this was a major issue for 70% of line managers in the study. 
Only in the importance of managerial training in the process was there little disparity 
between employers in the IPD survey and the observations of the middle managers. 
Training the managers was the most significant problem identified by employers in 
the IPD's survey but, whilst this issue was mentioned by an identical percentage of 
managers in the author's study, it was not identified as one of the most serious 
problems associated with PRP. 
 
Although middle managers have been identified as 'the critical communicators ' and 
the 'enactors of strategy set by top management' (Hutchinson et al.1997), those in the 
study reported a lack of ownership of performance-related pay processes, significant 
constraints in its application and real concerns about its fairness and effectiveness as a 
motivator. Their low commitment to organisational IPRP processes could, to a 
considerable extent, be explained by a perception that these had been essentially 
imposed with a different set of objectives to those publicly stated.  
 
Respondents viewed the costs of IPRP as significantly outweighing its benefits. The 
amount of managerial time it subsumed, the conflicts it could create and the potential 
for decisions that decreased rather than increased levels of employee trust were seen 
as more likely to lead to adverse consequences than positive outcomes. Whilst the 
control features of PRP were generally regarded as its main benefit to busy managers 
there was a recognition that this could also led to individuals resenting an erosion of 
their individual autonomy and an accompanying loss of initiative in their work roles.  
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Organisational constraints, work force values and their personal experiences of what 
motivated the majority of employees led the managers to have a far greater belief in 
the importance of demonstrating trustworthy behaviours as a means of encouraging 
employee commitment than paying for individual performance. In addition, 
perceptions of fairness among the managers were frequently more closely related to 
those of the employees they supervised than the principles reflected in the systems 
they had to apply. This was evident in a group of operational managers who 'adjusted 
and fine tuned' their interpretation and application of the PRP process to obtain a 'fit' 
with their own sense of fairness and what would be regarded as equitable by the 
majority of the workforce.  
 
The practical implications of this approach was the potential for diffusion and even a 
distortion of a scheme‘s key objectives, particularly in its ability to deliver longer-
term goals as the pressure of present demands. Using Rousseau's (1996) 
categorisation of transactional and relational psychological contracts, the majority of 
respondents placed a far higher value on relational contracts as a means of developing 
trust and co-operation than incentivising pay which was seen to encourage a more 
transactional approach to the employment relationship.  
 
Although there had been considerable attempts to demonstrate fairness in the reported 
PRP systems, most of the processes were so individually focused and transacted that 
the scope for lapses in procedural justice 'both alleged and real' were considerable. 
Many of the managers seemed intuitively aware of these pitfalls. Yet at times their 
attempts to avoid taking any risks in their decision making which might reflect badly 
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on their personal integrity or judgement could result in systems that were viewed with 
considerable cynicism and even as rather pointless in terms of their final outcomes. 
 
Finally there was evidence that the trend towards decentralisation had limited the 
integration of pay processes with other HR strategies as it relied heavily on line 
managers undertaking a co-ordinating role for which they had neither the time nor the 
inclination (Thornhill and Saunders, 1998). It is argued that a far most significant 
contribution that line managers can make to shaping HR policies may lie in 
communicating their sense of the values and beliefs of employees but there was little 
evidence in the study that this had been a consideration or had been reflected in the 
design and implementation of organisational performance-related pay systems. 
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